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We develop a currency mismatch index and examine the causes of currency mismatches 
in emerging market economies. This study is based on a unique dataset on 22 
economies from 2008 to 2017. We also construct the original sin index using granular 
data on international debt securities. We find Latin American countries, followed 
by Central European countries, suffer from the original sin and currency mismatch 
problems. The panel regression estimates show that country size, trade openness, and 
the level of economic and financial development explain cross-country variations in 
currency mismatches. Our empirical results suggest that unstable monetary and fiscal 
policies are the primary causes of currency mismatches. The results indicate that a 
better institutional environment reduces currency mismatches. These findings call for 
monetary independence, stable fiscal policy, and macroprudential policy measures to 
minimize currency mismatches.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The open-economy macroeconomics literature shows that high-level Foreign 
Currency Denominated Debt (FCD) increases systematic risk and exacerbate 
currency and debt crisis in Emerging and Developing Economies (EDEs). In 
the event of exchange rate depreciation, the cost of FCD increases and causes a 
negative balance sheet effect. However, currency risk can be hedged by earning 
foreign currency assets. The EDEs with high foreign currency assets, like that of 
China, can sustain substantial levels of FCD. Therefore, measuring the net foreign 
currency position of a country uncovers the extent of the currency mismatch 
problem. Currency mismatch is defined as the mismatch between assets and 
liabilities in which the liabilities are denominated in foreign currency and assets 
are in local currency (Goldstein and Turner, 2004). 
In this paper, we analyze the evolution of foreign currency exposure and 
currency mismatches in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) and investigate 
the causes of currency mismatches. In international finance architecture, the US 
dollar plays a key role in transactions and debt contracts. In currency borrowings, 
the dollar is the dominant currency because the dollar credit to the non-banking 
sector outside the US rose from 9.5 percent in 2007 to 14 percent in 2018 of world 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 2018). 
The dollar dominance is due to the inability of many EDEs to borrow from abroad 
in their own currency, and such inability often called “original sin” continues to 
be a source of concern (Eichengreen et al., 2005a; Acharya et al., 2015; Kuruc et 
al., 2016). The original sin problem can lead to an increase in the use of FCD and 
is likely to cause currency mismatches in EDEs. The recent currency and debt 
crisis in emerging economies indicate the importance of controlling the level of 
sovereign and corporate debt denominated in foreign currency (Du and Schreger, 
2016; Pradhan and Hiremath, 2019).
Similarly, the measurement of currency mismatches is essential because 
mismatches increase the likelihood of a financial crisis. Eichengreen et al. (2005a, 
b; 2007), Goldstein and Turner (2004), Park (2010), and Chui et al. (2018) emphasize 
the need for a comprehensive method of measuring currency mismatches in EMEs. 
Hence, the original sin and currency mismatch indicators assume significance and 
have important implications for economic growth and macroeconomic policy.
We contribute to the literature on open economy macroeconomics in multiple 
ways. First, we develop an index to measure currency mismatches. This index 
helps to better understand foreign currency exposure by EMEs. The original sin 
hypothesis (Eichengreen et al., 2005a) and aggregate effective currency mismatch 
(Goldstein and Turner, 2004) are primary currency mismatch indicators. These 
indicators suffer from several drawbacks. The method for measuring external 
vulnerabilities should be based on data broken down by currency (nationality 
approach) rather than the residence principle because the domestic financial 
relations of the country are associated with the rest of the world (Tobal, 2018). 
We compare the original sin index with country-level data on the share of 
foreign currency debt in total debt outstanding. Besides, we explore the recent 
developments in foreign currency exposure. Gagnon (2014), Tobal (2018), and 
Chui et al. (2018) document that EMEs lengthened their foreign currency exposure 
during the recent period, and the literature on currency mismatches paid little 
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attention to these currency risks (Baek, 2013; Benetrix et al., 2015). In this context, 
the study assumes further importance. 
Second, we employ diverse and comprehensive data sets on foreign currency 
exposure, and, thus, the results and implications of our study are robust. 
Specifically, we use balance sheet information to calculate the net asset position in 
foreign currency held by EMEs. Further, we construct a unique dataset to measure 
the currency mismatches in EMEs. We follow the methodology of Kuruc et al. 
(2016) and Chui et al. (2018) to develop the currency mismatch index. Third, we 
estimate the original sin index for the EMEs using granular data on international 
debt securities. We also use panel regression analysis to conduct an empirical 
analysis on currency mismatches, and this captures the heterogeneity across 
countries. The panel regression methodology accounts for time-varying and 
unobserved characteristics of the covariates of currency mismatches. 
As our next contribution, we provide evidence on the role of effective monetary 
and fiscal policies in controlling currency mismatches. The first school of thought 
holds international factors, such as transaction costs, externalities, and global market 
imperfections, as causes of currency mismatches (Hausmann and Panizza, 2003; 
Eichengreen et al., 2005 a, b). In contrast, the second school emphasizes domestic 
factors, such as lack of monetary policy credibility, ineffective macroeconomic 
policy, and institutions, as the leading causes of financial instability and currency 
mismatches in EMEs (Goldstein and Turner, 2004; Özmen and Arinsoy, 2005). 
Fiscal policy also plays a crucial role in the management of external debt (Reinhart 
et al., 2003). However, no study empirically tests these propositions using a 
complete measure of currency mismatches. 
Finally, to our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the role of 
macroprudential policy and monetary independence in controlling currency 
mismatches across EMEs. We examine a wide range of macroeconomic and 
institutional factors, which were not analyzed in the context of currency mismatches 
in previous studies. Macroprudential policy measures enhance exchange rate and 
financial system stability (Purnawan et al., 2015). Hence, our study has substantial 
research and policy implications for macroprudential frameworks. 
We find that EMEs face severe financial fragilities and currency mismatch 
problems in the presence of a high value of the original sin. We show that both 
monetary and fiscal policies play a significant role in controlling currency 
mismatches. We also document the effects of monetary independence and 
macroprudential policy on currency mismatches. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
conceptual framework and analytical issues of currency mismatches. In Section III, 
we discuss the stylized facts of foreign currency exposure and currency mismatch 
measurements. We describe the data and methodology in Section IV. The results 
and discussions are presented in Section V, while Section VI concludes the paper 
with policy implications and suggestions.
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYTICAL ISSUES
A. Conceptual Issues 
Researchers view currency risk in three ways, namely debt intolerance, original sin, 
and currency mismatch. These three concepts focus on the open economy balance 
sheet effects with varied directions. Reinhart et al. (2003) define debt intolerance as 
the inability of many EDEs to handle external debt levels. Eichengreen et al. (2005b) 
develop the original sin hypothesis to explain the inability of EDEs to borrow in 
their own currencies. The term ‘currency mismatch’ introduced by Goldstein and 
Turner (2004) is the difference between the currency composition of liabilities 
and assets. Currency mismatch is the consequence of the original sin and debt 
intolerance problem. Eichengreen et al. (2007) argue that these three concepts are 
analytically distinct and focus on the problem of the structure of global financial 
markets. In light of these arguments, we emphasize the importance of measuring 
currency risk and investigate the factors determining currency mismatches.
B. Causes of Currency Mismatches: Theoretical and Empirical Framework
The theoretical framework of our study builds on the moral hazard and original 
sin hypotheses. The pegged exchange rate regime offers an implicit guarantee to 
the borrowers against foreign currency debt. Such a guarantee leads to a moral 
hazard problem by incentivizing excessive risk (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 
1999). The fixed exchange rate regime increases the unhedged foreign currency 
debt1. Government bailouts and rescue packages of international financial 
institutions act as the implicit guarantees on external debts and lead to financial 
fragility. The original sin hypothesis shows that the flexible exchange rate regime 
lowers the FCD and enhances financial stability. Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999) suggest dollarization as an acceptable solution to control the moral hazard 
problem. However, Goldstein and Turner (2004) and Tobal (2013) refute the idea 
of dollarizing the economy. They argue that dollarization increases currency 
mismatches in EMEs. 
Two schools of thought discuss the causes of currency mismatches in EMEs. 
The first school opines that currency mismatch occurs because of international 
factors, such as the imperfection in global capital markets, transaction costs, and 
network externalities, rather than inefficient domestic policies (Hausman and 
Panizza, 2003; Eichengreen et al., 2005a, b). In contrast, Goldstein and Turner 
(2004) and Özmen and Arinsoy (2005) argue that domestic factors are the primary 
causes of currency mismatches. 
Empirically, Baek (2013) tests the determinants of currency mismatches using 
Lane and Shambaugh’s (2010a) data on foreign currency exposure. Nevertheless, 
the data overestimates within-country foreign currency exposure and is 
inappropriate for partially dollarized economies. Further, the study does not show 
the influence of monetary and fiscal policies as well as exchange rate regimes on 
currency mismatches. Goldstein and Turner (2004) argue that these factors are 
significant causes of currency mismatches. 
1 See Mishkin (1996) and Obstfeld (1998).
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III. FOREIGN CURRENCY EXPOSURE AND CURRENCY MISMATCHES: 
STYLIZED FACTS 
The measurement of foreign currency risk and currency mismatches in EMEs 
is challenging due to insufficient data. We select a group of 22 EMEs over the 
period of 2008 to 2017, and data availability dedicates the sample (see Table 1 for 
country coverage). We adopt the new methodology suggested by Kuruc et al. 
(2016) and Chui et al. (2018) to measure currency mismatches in EMEs. To achieve 
this objective, we collect the data from BIS, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and World Bank databases. We calculate aggregate effective currency mismatch 
(AECM ) as follows:
where NFCA denotes the net foreign currency assets.2 M and X are, respectively, 
the country’s imports and exports of goods and services; FCTD represents foreign 
currency share of the total debt.3 AECM > 0 indicates a net asset position in foreign 
currency of a country, whereas the AECM < 0 suggests a net liability position; 
AECM = 0 indicates no currency mismatch or that foreign currency liabilities equal 
assets.
The original sin (OSIN) index ranges between 0 and 1. Values close to one 
imply a severe original sin position, and close to zero implies a secure position. 
Eichengreen et al. (2007) argue that a greater value of original sin leads to high 
currency mismatches. We present the computed OSIN values for a sample of 20 
EMEs in Table 2. The original sin index shows that Latin American economies 
have a greater original sin problem followed by the Central European countries. 
The higher level of original sin in these economies indicates an increase in foreign 
currency risk. For example, Indawan et al. (2015) show that the foreign currency 
liabilities in Indonesia are increasing, which, in turn, increase the risk of domestic 
currency depreciation. In contrast, giant economies in Asia, such as China, Chinese 
Taipei, and India, have the least original sin problem. The development of the 
domestic bond market led to a drop in original sin value in these economies. 
2 The positive NFCA denotes net asset position in foreign currency, and negative value implies net 
liability position in foreign currency. The negative NFCA leads to negative currency mismatches in 
EDEs. The NFCA includes net foreign assets of monetary authorities and deposits of money banks, 
and foreign currency assets of non-banks held with BIS reporting banks minus foreign currency 
liabilities of non-banks to BIS reporting banks and international debt securities outstanding. 
3 The FCTD denotes the composite of liabilities of nonbanks and non-banks to BIS reporting, domestic 
credit to the private sector, international and domestic debt securities outstanding. 
(1)
(2)
(3)
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Table 1. 
Region-wise Sample
This table presents the region-wise distribution of 22 EMEs. 
Latin America (7) Central Europe (3) Asia (8) Other EMEs (4)
Argentina Czech Republic China Russia
Brazil Hungary Chinese Taipei Israel
Chile Poland India Turkey
Colombia Indonesia South Africa
Mexico Malaysia 
Peru Philippines
Venezuela South Korea
Thailand
Table 2.
Original Sin Index
This table provides the estimates of original sin index values based on a sample of 20 EMEs for the period 2008 to 2018. 
The original sin index is defined in Eq. (3). We calculate the index employing the data on international debt securities 
of Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The original sin value closer to one indicates serious original sin problem 
implying that the country has little ability to issue international debt in its own currency.
Country/Region 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Latin America 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92
Argentina 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Brazil 0.72 0.75 0.71 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.80
Chile 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98
Colombia 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.87
Mexico 0.66 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.89 0.88
Venezuela 0.84 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Central Europe 0.49 0.55 0.63 0.70 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.49 0.61 0.63 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73
Hungary 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95
Poland 0.58 0.72 0.75 0.79 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88
Asia 0.84 0.80 0.75 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.78
China 0.63 0.50 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.37 0.47
Chinese Taipei 0.85 0.76 0.75 0.86 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98
India 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.76 0.73 0.59 0.54
Indonesia 0.85 0.86 0.78 0.68 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.89
Malaysia 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96
Philippines 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94
Thailand 0.74 0.67 0.60 0.39 0.27 0.34 0.48 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.70
Other EMEs 0.55 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.72
Israel 0.85 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
Russia 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.72 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.83 0.85 0.82 0.85
South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.21
Turkey 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.57 0.61 0.69 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.83
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Many of the EMEs reduced the original sin problem in their aggregate balance 
sheets because of constraints imposed by domestic financial distress on their 
ability to borrow. This evidence contradicts the view that EMEs are successful in 
converting FCD into local currency-denominated debt and developed their bond 
market (Gagnon, 2014; Chui et al., 2018). Although India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand began to develop their local bond markets but are still in the early stages 
of development (Park, 2010; and Indawan et al., 2015).
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
The data covers 22 EMEs in Latin America, Asia, and Central Europe for the 
period of 2008 to 2017. The data coverage have some crucial advantages. First, 
the EMEs are under stress during the post-global financial crisis (GFC) period.4 
Second, the recent currency depreciation of EMEs against the US dollar is due to 
high inflation and current account deficit, which possibly lead to an increase in the 
currency mismatch problem. The exchange rate depreciation is a good barometer 
to measure the stress in EMEs (Figure 1). Third, the series of events occurred in 
EMEs throughout the study period, such as the taper tantrum crisis, currency 
devaluation, and a slowdown in China, trade tensions escalation, and Lira and 
peso crises, which created financial stress in these markets, as shown in Figure 1.
4 See, BIS Quarterly review, September 2018. 
Figure 1. 
EMEs Stress and Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities
The figure presents recent financial stress and vulnerabilities in EMEs. The left-hand panel shows that macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities of EMEs generate high exchange rate depreciation against the US dollar (31 July 2018 to 12 September 
2018). The right-hand panel corresponds to the financial stress of the EMEs in a series of events such as taper tantrum 
crisis (May to September 2013), China’s currency devaluation and slowdown (August 2015 to January 2016), trade 
tensions escalate (March to July 2018) and Lira and peso crises (August to September 2018). Equity loss measured 
with the MSCI EMEs index (in $). Foreign currency depreciation (FX) based on the trade-weighted $ index. LC and 
USD represent the local currency and US dollar-denominated spreads, respectively. Data is taken from the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) reports.
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Furthermore, tight financial conditions, such as equity loss and currency 
depreciation, create pressure on EMEs, and lower their ability to borrow in 
domestic currency in international markets. The focus on data after 2008 ensures 
that complete currency mismatch indicators are available after this period. 
Moreover, our AECM estimates confirm the net liability position of these EMEs 
in foreign currency since 2013 (Figure 2). Such liability indicates that AECM has 
significantly moved from positive to negative position.
Figure 1. 
EMEs Stress and Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities (Continued)
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Figure 2. 
Cross-Sectional Distribution of AECM (%)
This figure shows the cross-sectional distribution of the 25th and 75th percentile of aggregate effective currency 
mismatch (AECM) for 22 EMEs from 2008 to 2017. The figure indicates that the first quartile of AECM has significantly 
moved from a favourable position to a negative position. Data Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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B. Empirical Model
We use panel regression models to investigate the effects of global and country-
specific macroeconomic factors on currency mismatches. Goldstein and Turner 
(2004), Eichengreen et al. (2007), Baek (2013), and Benetrix et al. (2015) suggest 
an association of monetary credibility, exchange rate volatility, country size, 
trade openness, institutional quality, and financial development with currency 
mismatches. The other important policy factors—monetary independence, 
macroprudential measures, original sin, and debt intolerance—are relevant for 
liability position in foreign currency. We describe the variables and data sources 
in Table 3. We estimate the following panel regression model:
(4)
where the dependent variable is ; 
AECMi,t is the aggregate effective currency mismatch computed using Eq. (1) or (2); 
MAECMi,t denotes the modified currency mismatch indicator for country i at time 
t. The MAECMi,t includes the domestic bank loans and bonds that are denominated 
in foreign currencies.5 To facilitate the comparison, we convert AECM and MAECM 
into CM and MCM, respectively, and, therefore, a high value of CM indicates a 
high currency mismatch (net liability position in foreign currency). αi is a country-
specific fixed-effect, which controls the time-invariant unobserved characteristic of 
country i. Sizei,t is the country size measured as the log levels of GDP; INFi,t denotes 
the inflation rate; ERVi,t refers to the standard deviation of the first log difference of 
quarterly local currencies against the US dollar rate over the current and the past 
year; TOi,t and Ka_openi,t are the indicators of trade openness (trade as a percentage 
of GDP) and capital openness (Chinn-Ito’s capital account openness index). The 
institutional quality index (Qualityi,t), comprising 12 indicators, ranges between 0 
and 100; MIIi,t is the monetary independence index constructed by Aizenman et al. 
(2013). εi,t is the error term. The panel regression approach uses the cross-sectional 
and time-variation of information on currency mismatches across the countries. 
In this empirical framework, some covariates overlap, but such variables are 
measured differently.
Previous studies find monetary policy as a significant determinant of currency 
mismatches in EDEs (Eichengreen et al., 2005b; Goldstein and Turner, 2004; 
Jeanne, 2005; Tobal, 2013). The lack of effective monetary policy exposes the 
EDEs to systemic risk, and, in turn, adversely affecting the domestic borrowers 
holding FCD. Therefore, foreign and domestic investors insist on lending in 
domestic currencies because of higher inflation and lesser protection in the 
domestic market. Specifically, Goldstein and Turner (2004), and Jeanne (2005) 
hold monetary policy credibility—a measure of inflation volatility—as a leading 
cause of currency mismatch. Thus, countries with high and volatile inflation have 
a greater tendency to issue debt in foreign currencies. Empirically, Baek (2013) 
find a positive association between inflation and currency mismatches. 
5 We assume that domestic bonds and loans are denominated in domestic currencies in all EMEs, 
while computing .
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Table 3.
Variables Definition and Sources
This table defines variables and cite sources of data. Authors’ calculations are based on data obtained from BIS: 
Bank for International Settlements; IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF; World Bank; and National sources. 
Other variables are sourced from WDI: World Development Indicators. PRS Group, ICRG: International Country Risk 
Guide; IIF: Institute of International Finance. 
Acronym
Variable 
Name
Exp. 
Sign
Description Source
CM Currency mismatch NA
CM > 0 indicates liability position in foreign currency (%). 
CMi,t = (AECMit)*(-1); AECM denote aggregate effective 
currency mismatch constructed in Eq. (1) and (2).
Authors’ 
own 
calculations
MCM
Modified 
currency 
mismatch
NA
Revised CM estimates include the domestic bank loans and 
domestic bonds denominated in foreign currency. In CM, we 
assume that domestic bonds and loans are denominated in 
domestic currency in all EMEs.
Authors’ 
own 
calculations
Size Country size (±) GDP in log levels (current, millions of US dollars). IFS
INF Inflation (+) Percentage change, end of period consumer prices (%). WDI
ERV Exchange rate volatility (+)
The standard deviation of the first log difference of quarterly 
local currency against the US dollar rate over the current and 
the past year, annualized (%).
IFS
TO Trade openness (−) Trade (% of GDP). WDI
Quality Institutional quality index (−)
Index value ranges between 0 and 100; it comprises 12 
indicators, namely government stability, socioeconomic 
conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, 
law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, 
and bureaucracy quality.
PRS Group, 
ICRG
MII
Monetary 
independence 
index
(−)
Calculated as the reciprocal of the annual correlation 
between the monthly interest rates of the home country and 
the base country.
Aizenman 
et al. (2013)
Ka_open Capital openness (+)
The index measures the country’s degree of capital 
account openness. Ka_open is the binary dummy variable 
that codifies the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions reported in IMF’s annual report on 
exchange rate arrangements and exchange rate restrictions.
Chinn and 
Ito (2006)
Peg
Hard peg 
exchange 
rate regime
(+)
Binary dummy hard peg = 1 (includes categories of 1-2 
Coarse classification) of exchange rate regime of Ilzetzki et 
al., 2018) otherwise 0. 
Ilzetzki et 
al. (2018)
FC
Limits on 
foreign 
currency 
loans 
(−)
The macroprudential policy of limits on foreign currency 
loans. It reduces the vulnerability to foreign currency risk 
(index value 0 and 1) Cerutti 
et al.
(2017)
DTI
Limits on 
debt to 
income ratio
(−)
The macroprudential policy constrains the household 
indebtedness by enforcing or encouraging a limit (index 
value 0 and 1)
INFV Inflation volatility (+)
The standard deviation of the first log difference of quarterly 
consumer price index over the current and past year, 
annualized (%).
IFS
POP Population (±) Total Population in log levels ( in millions) WDI
EXP Exports (−) Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI
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Besides, the extant literature shows fiscal policy as a prominent cause of 
currency mismatches. Weak government policies (debt management) compel 
monetary officials to devalue the domestic currencies to lower the real value of 
debt obligations. Goldstein and Turner (2004) opine that fiscal prudence helps 
to reduce currency mismatches; they argue that neither the local government 
nor international financial institutions have an effective policy on public debt 
management. In a similar vein, Reinhart et al. (2003) find fiscal policy as a critical 
factor in the management of external debt. Moreover, Hausmann and Panizza 
(2003) predict that governments address the fiscal solvency issues through a rising 
inflation rate and FCD. Hence, larger share of sovereign debt and high inflation 
pose a severe threat to borrowing in domestic currencies, this is the vicious circle 
of domestic original sin. However, they find no relationship between the original 
sin and fiscal policy. 
The exchange rate policy is closely related to the monetary policy of an 
economy; and the policy is an essential determining factor of high currency 
mismatches. Exchange rate depreciation can raise the value of FCD and increase 
currency mismatches. Baek (2013) finds a positive association between exchange 
rate volatility and currency mismatches, and shows that higher exchange rate 
volatility raises the FCD and hedging cost. Nonetheless, Eichengreen et al. (2005a) 
find no such relationship. In fixed exchange rate regimes, firms are unable to 
internalize their exchange rate risk, whereas flexible exchange rate regimes can 
reduce currency risk and mismatches (Martı́nez and Werner, 2002). For example, 
Mexico had a currency mismatch problem because of its fixed exchange rate 
regime. Using the de-facto exchange rate regime, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) 
empirically show a positive association between the original sin and exchange rate 
regimes. 
Trade and capital account openness also influence currency mismatches. 
Trade openness increases domestic consumption and foreign currency assets 
through imports and exports. The foreign currency assets in the domestic markets 
can increase the credit facilities and decrease the FCD, which lowers the currency 
mismatches. Empirically, Eichengreen et al. (2005a) and Baek (2013) document 
Table 3.
Variables Definition and Sources (Continued)
Acronym
Variable 
Name
Exp. 
Sign
Description Source
Regime Exchange rate regimes (−)
Coarse classification starts from rigid regime to a more 
flexible exchange rate regime (index value 1 to 6)
Ilzetzki et 
al. (2018)
LD Level of development (−) GDP per capita in log levels (current, US dollars) WDI
M2 Financial development (−) Broad money supply (% of GDP). WDI
OSIN Original sin (+) The original sin index is defined in Eq. (3). 
Authors’ 
own 
calculations
DI Debt intolerance (−) Total external debt (% of GDP). IIF
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the role of trade openness in reducing currency mismatches. Countries with a 
free capital account hold substantial debt in foreign currencies, and, hence, have 
higher currency mismatches (Barajas and Morales, 2003). In EMEs, capital account 
openness increases the volatility in all levels of investment, such as Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), portfolio investment, and loans. Park and An (2012) investigate 
the effect of capital account openness in economies with and without the original 
sin. They show how capital account openness tends to increase capital volatility 
and the original sin problem in EMEs. They caution EMEs about capital account 
openness because their currencies are not internationalized. However, Hausmann 
and Panizza (2003) opine that capital controls may discourage a foreign investor 
from investing in the domestic market in local currency. Baek (2013) estimates 
the relationship between currency mismatches and capital account openness and 
finds an inverse relationship between capital account liberalization and currency 
mismatches. 
The literature discusses how weak domestic institutions in EDEs lower 
local currency denominated debts, resulting in borrowing in foreign currencies. 
Countries with high-quality institutions can issue debt in domestic currencies and 
generate more foreign currency assets. Thus, the strength of local institutions is a 
crucial factor in reducing currency mismatches. In an influential paper, Lane and 
Shambaugh (2010b) investigate the determinants of foreign currency exposure 
in cross-country balance sheets. They document an inverse association between 
institutional quality and currency mismatches.
Nonetheless, Baek (2013) finds a positive relationship between institutional 
quality and currency mismatches. Better institutions induces the domestic agents 
to borrow in foreign currencies. Moreover, larger economies can limit foreign 
currency exposure due to cost advantage. These economies can borrow in domestic 
currencies, compared to small economies (see Lane and Milesi-Ferrentti, 2001; 
Hausmann and Panizza, 2003; and Eichengreen et al., 2005a, b).
In the aftermath of the GFC, many EDEs opted for macroprudential policy 
measures to limit external shocks, in addition to lowering capital controls. The 
pertinent literature emphasizes the importance of macroprudential policy in 
controlling currency mismatches (Goldstein and Turner, 2004; Dell’ Ariccia et 
al., 2012; Tobal, 2018). In EDEs, monetary independence allows the central banks 
to freely operate and maintain the stability of the economy to limit currency 
mismatches. Financial depth is an important cause of currency mismatches in 
EDEs. The lack of financial development in EDEs dries up the available liquidity. 
Theoretically, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) illustrate how lower financial 
depth in the domestic market results in more considerable dollar-denominated 
debt in EMEs. Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Baek (2013) consider financial 
depth as an outstanding credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. They find 
a higher propensity for currency mismatches when the level of domestic credit to 
the private sector is lower. 
C. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
The summary statistics and correlations for all the variables are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5, respectively. Negative value of CM and MCM imply net asset 
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position in foreign currency in EMEs. The currency mismatch indicators reveal 
Argentina, Chile, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey as the countries with an average 
net liability position in foreign currencies, whereas Chinese Taipei, Peru, Russia, 
and Venezuela are economies with the net asset position in foreign currencies in 
our sample. The countries with an average original sin of 0.76 are still unable to 
issue debt in their currencies. Likewise, many EMEs have external debts higher 
than their GDP (i.e. up to 156.1 percent higher), leading to the debt intolerance. The 
correlation analysis confirms weak correlation among the explanatory variables, 
indicating weak evidence of multicollinearity. 
Table 4.
Summary Statistics
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of currency mismatch indicators and all other covariates employed 
in the empirical model. The estimation period is from 2008 to 2017. Variables and data are as defined in Table 3. The 
mean, median, standard deviation, percentile distribution, skewness, and kurtosis statistics are presented. We include 
the log values of GDP (size), Population (POP), and GDP per capita (LD); Standard deviation of CPI and Exchange rate 
in our regressions. Therefore, the values in descriptive statistics are presented in log levels and Standard deviation 
values.
Variables   N Mean Median St.Dev Min p25 p75 Max Skewness Kurtosis
CM 220 -3.74 -3.00 8.39 -33.31 -5.32 -0.63 24.91 -0.49 4.94
MCM 220 -5.91 -4.07 14.04 -55.78 -9.96 -0.77 38.20 -0.72 5.28
Size 220 13.22 12.95 0.99 11.70 12.54 13.91 16.30 0.93 3.63
INF 220 5.42 3.62 6.06 -1.51 2.02 6.49 30.90 2.39 8.74
ERV 220 12.52 10.85 8.17 0.00 6.39 16.40 42.43 1.08 4.09
TO 220 74.29 59.24 40.12 22.11 46.80 96.96 176.67 0.98 2.84
Quality 220 65.65 64.27 8.84 44.00 59.95 74.31 80.62 -0.13 2.38
MII 220 0.51 0.52 0.17 0.04 0.40 0.63 0.97 -0.21 3.00
Ka_open 210 0.50 0.45 0.32 0.00 0.17 0.72 1.00 0.25 1.81
Peg 220 0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.65
FC 210 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.72
DTI 210 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 1.60
INFV 200 1.64 1.22 1.79 0.18 0.65 1.98 20.35 6.18 61.56
POP 220 4.10 3.89 1.33 1.99 3.37 4.79 7.24 0.80 3.35
EXP 210 36.97 29.71 21.77 10.71 22.57 45.34 99.50 1.14 3.17
Regime 220 2.71 3.00 0.73 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 0.86 5.58
LD 220 9.12 9.26 0.75 6.90 8.71 9.56 10.60 -0.65 3.28
M2 210 73.92 67.00 39.71 23.49 42.89 82.93 208.46 1.25 4.23
OSIN 210 0.76 0.85 0.27 0.00 0.70 0.96 1.00 -1.70 5.13
DI 200 42.24 34.00 26.93 8.22 26.80 47.00 156.10 2.14 8.11
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D. Model Specification Tests
The cross-section dependence test (Pesaran, 2015) examines the null hypothesis of 
cross-sectional independence in the data. The preliminary results reject the null 
hypothesis, suggesting that all factors are cross-sectional dependent (Table 6). In 
the presence of cross-sectional dependence, the standard errors of panel regressions 
do not produce reliable and unbiased estimates due to the occurrence of the multi-
factor structure of the error term. Moreover, we test the random-effects (vs. pooled 
OLS), heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation in panel regression models. The test 
statistics reject the null hypothesis for the estimated baseline regression models 
(1-5). 
Table 6. 
Cross-Sectional Dependence Test
This table presents estimates of the cross-sectional dependence test of Pesaran (2015). *** denote the rejection of null 
about parameters at 1% significance level. The variables are as defined in Table 3.
Variable CD
CM 10.43***
MCM 10.26***
Size 48.06***
INF 38.95***
ERV 39.95***
TO 47.73***
Quality 48.01***
MII 43.82***
Ka_open 40.96***
Peg 05.94***
FC 05.46***
DTI 04.99***
INFV 34.13***
POP 48.06***
EXP 45.31***
Regime 46.38***
LD 48.06***
M2 45.64***
OSIN 41.67***
DI 42.02***
The fixed-effect and random-effect estimators are consistent, but the estimated 
standard errors are biased in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, 
heteroscedasticity, and serial correlation (Table 7). Therefore, we estimate the 
panel regression models with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors6, which 
are robust in the presence of a serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and cross-
6 Estimation of the standard errors with Newy and West or cluster–robust standard errors instead 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) are not relevant in the presence of cross-sectional dependence because the 
correlations across panels of cross-sections take non-zero values.
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sectional dependence. Further, these estimates are suitable for short panel data 
models, where N is large and T is small. Finally, the results of the Sargan-Hansen 
and Hausman specification statistics reject the random-effects in favor of the fixed-
effect models.
Table 7.
Model Specification Tests
This table presents model specification test statistics and regression diagnostic checks such as random-effects, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (1980) test is suitable for random-
effects vs. pooled OLS regression. 
Tests Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Breusch-Pagan LM 497.23*** 310.71*** 303.87*** 203.35*** 266.60***
Modified Wald 6444.64*** 5004.30*** 2140.46*** 1526.69*** 1546.82***
Wooldridge Autocorrelation 26.09*** 21.85*** 32.09*** 21.74*** 13.62***
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Baseline Regression Results
We present estimates of the baseline regression (i.e. Eq. 4) in Table 8. In the first 
model (i.e. column 2), we examine whether the currency mismatches are associated 
with high inflation, exchange rate volatility, trade openness, institutional quality, 
monetary independence, and country size. We find a positive relationship between 
currency mismatch and country size. The result shows that large EMEs (in terms 
of GDP) hold liability position in foreign currencies. This finding contrasts the one 
documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferrentti (2001), Hausmann and Panizza (2003), 
and Eichengreen et al. (2007). 
A stronger monetary policy framework can lower the incentives to borrow 
in foreign currencies and reduce the currency mismatch problem. Thus, lower 
inflation that results from stronger monetary policy is associated with the greater 
use of domestic currency debts. The results suggest a positive and statistically 
significant effect of inflation on currency mismatches. This positive association 
is consistent with the idea that countries with higher inflation have a greater 
tendency to issue FCD, which causes currency mismatch problem. The association 
between currency mismatch and trade openness is negative and significant in the 
fifth model (column 6). This evidence suggests that a country with high imports 
and exports has a low currency mismatch problem. For instance, high trade 
openness increases foreign currency earnings and reduces the liability position in 
foreign currency. Moreover, more open countries (in terms of trade) have better 
access to foreign currency assets and international financial markets compared to 
closed countries. 
We also investigate the role of institutional and policy factors in the currency 
mismatch problem. High-quality institutions can provide the appropriate 
microeconomic incentives, pursue good macroeconomic and exchange rate 
policies, and nurture confidence in the economy (Goldstein and Turner, 2004). 
We expect that EMEs with better institutions can control currency mismatches. 
To test this argument, we employ the institutional quality index developed by the 
PRS Group. The index is the sum of 12 indicators, namely government stability, 
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socio-economic conditions, and others.7 The index vary from zero to 100; higher 
value implies better quality institutions in the country. We find strong evidence 
that institutional factors are relevant determinants of currency mismatches. 
Specifically, the results indicate that a country with high-quality institutions can 
issue debts in its own currency and, thus, limit the currency mismatch problem. 
Therefore, Asian economies with high-quality institutions are associated with low 
levels of currency mismatches. This finding supports the theoretical prediction 
and refutes Baek’s (2013) finding that good institutional quality aggravates the 
FCD and currency mismatches in EMEs.
One of the critical contributions of our study is to analyze the impact of monetary 
independence on currency mismatches. Bianchi and Mondragon (2018) argue that 
the lack of monetary independence in EMEs aggravates the sovereign debt crisis 
and increases their vulnerability to roll over debt crisis. Therefore, we examine the 
association between currency mismatches and monetary independence in EMEs. 
We use the index of monetary independence developed by Aizenman et al. (2013). 
The index is “the reciprocal of annual correlation between monthly interest rates 
of the home country and the base country.” The estimated coefficient on monetary 
independence is negative and significant, which implies that lack of monetary 
independence in EMEs aggravates the currency mismatch problem. However, this 
effect is insignificant after adding the other explanatory variables in the model (3) 
and (5). This result is driven by an association between interest rates and choice of 
exchange rate regimes.
In the second model, we include the capital openness index (Chinn and Ito, 
2006), exchange rate pegs (Ilzetzki et al., 2018), the macroprudential policy indices 
developed by Cerutti et al. (2017), and inflation volatility to examine whether these 
factors cause the currency mismatches in EMEs. The index of capital openness 
measures the country’s degree of capital account openness. Ka_open is a binary 
dummy variable and denotes the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions reported in IMF. The coefficient of Ka_open is positive, 
implying a higher degree of currency mismatch problem for financially liberalized 
countries. The greater financial openness increases the volatility in all levels of 
investment, such as FDI, portfolio investment, and loans, in EDEs. Therefore, 
countries pursuing capital account liberalization hold more foreign currency debt 
because of better access to loans. This finding supports the work of Barajas and 
Morales (2003) on the dollarization of liabilities in Latin America.
In fixed exchange rate regimes, low incentives to hedge foreign currency risk 
create currency mismatches in EMEs. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) argue that countries 
with fixed exchange rate regimes do not have an effective monetary policy 
instrument and have limited scope for supervising foreign currency exposure. In 
model (2), we find the coefficient of the peg positive but statistically insignificant, 
meaning that there is no strong evidence on the effect of pegged exchange rate 
regimes on currency mismatches. In model (3), we examine whether the choice of 
exchange regimes affects currency mismatches by employing an index prepared 
by Ilzetzki et al. (2018). The index is based on coarse classification from pegged to a 
more flexible exchange rate regime, and its values lie between one and six. We find 
7 See Howell (2011) for the discussion on the methodology. 
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that economies with flexible exchange rate policies reduce the currency mismatch 
problem. This evidence is in line with that of Goldstein and Turner (2004) and 
Baek (2013). 
Recently, macroprudential measures are assuming importance as the best 
policy to mitigate external shocks and systemic risks. Unlike the existing literature, 
this study empirically tests the role of macroprudential policy in controlling 
currency mismatches. We include two instruments of prudential policies in 
baseline regression—limits on foreign currency loans (FC) and debt to income 
ratio (DTI). These are binary variables, which take one for a country with limits 
on the FC and DTI, and zero otherwise. Cerutti et al. (2017) find limits on FC and 
DTI reduce the vulnerability to foreign currency risk and household indebtedness.
Our estimates confirm that greater limitations on foreign currency loans 
and debt-income ratio reduce the net liability position in foreign currencies. The 
coefficient on DTI is economically and statistically significant across all models. 
Moreover, FC is inversely associated with currency mismatches, and only 
significant in fifth model (column 6). The limits on FC loans reduce countries’ 
vulnerability to foreign currency risk. Similarly, enforcing the constraints on 
household debt to income ratios lower their indebtedness. These results are in line 
with Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012), who found a significant impact of macroprudential 
policy instruments on credit booms in Central and Eastern European countries. 
In model (3), we use alternative proxies to check the robustness of the baseline 
results. The results are significant and in line with the models (1) and (2). In model 
(4), we control for the levels of economic and the financial development measured 
by GDP per capita and broad money supply (M2), respectively.8 We find a negative 
association between the level of economic development and currency mismatches. 
This finding suggests that well-developed EMEs can control currency mismatches. 
Although the coefficient of M2 is statistically insignificant, it is negative and may 
indicate that high liquid assets is associated with low currency mismatches. This 
appears to be consistent with Goldstein and Turner (2004), who argue that the 
development of the domestic bond market plays a vital role in limiting currency 
mismatches in EMEs.
Finally, we examine whether the debt-related variables, namely the original 
sin and debt intolerance, in the baseline model (5) determine the level of currency 
mismatches. In this model, we exclude the levels of economic and financial 
development because they may be plausibly correlated with the original sin. 
The estimates show a positive association of the original sin index with currency 
mismatches, implying that the greater the FCD, the higher the original sin, and, 
in turn, the severe the problem of currency mismatches. This finding supports the 
view of Tobal (2018).
The relationship between external debt levels and sovereign risks are 
documented in Reinhart et al. (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). We find the 
coefficient of debt intolerance negative and significant suggesting that the share 
of total external debt in GDP determines the extent of currency mismatch. This 
evidence indicates that high debt intolerant economies are not even able to access 
8 We use broad money supply (M2) as a proxy for financial development, consistent with Goldstein 
and Turner (2004), and Baek (2013).
Currency Mismatches in Emerging Market Economies: Is Winter Coming? 43
loans in foreign currencies. Therefore, they do not have the liability position in 
foreign currencies. Earlier, Reinhart et al. (2003) argue that the consequence of 
debt intolerance results in slower growth and higher macroeconomic volatility. 
However, “constrained access to international capital markets is best viewed as a 
symptom, not a cause, of the disease.”
B. Robustness Tests and Endogeneity Issues
First, we use alternative covariates of the benchmark regression to evaluate the 
robustness of our findings. Second, we repeat the econometric analysis with a 
modified currency mismatch measure. Third, we address potential endogeneity 
problem. 
We further investigate the issue by including variables, such as POPi,t, INFVi,t, 
EXPi,t, and Regimei,t, to assess the effect of country size, inflation, trade openness, and 
exchange rate regimes, respectively, on currency mismatches. POPi,t, INFVi,t,EXPi,t, 
and Regimei,t, denote population, inflation volatility, exports and exchange rate 
regimes, respectively. The results presented in Table 8 confirm that large EMEs (in 
terms of the population) have a currency mismatch problem. 
Table 8. 
Baseline Regression Results
The table shows the estimates (fixed effect) of the baseline regression Eq. (4). The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are 
in parentheses. The statistical significance levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 
the currency mismatch. The variables definition and data sources presented in Table 3.
Currency Mismatch  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Size 3.977*** 4.240** 36.056*** 5.505***
 (0.808) (1.385) (6.152) (1.293)
INF 0.348** 0.303** 0.256*
 (0.116) (0.111) (0.116)
ERV 0.129*** 0.115*** 0.093*** 0.127*** 0.112**
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.037)
TO -0.046 -0.069 -0.043 -0.071**
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.033) (0.023)
Quality -0.199*** -0.383*** -0.391*** -0.140 -0.316***
 (0.039) (0.023) (0.043) (0.105) (0.054)
MII -3.385** -1.546* -0.890 -1.406* 1.612
 (1.126) (0.743) (0.510) (0.717) (2.232)
Ka_open 0.924 1.503 3.606* 1.975
 (1.946) (1.367) (1.717) (1.780)
Peg 0.956 -1.518 -3.164*
 (1.106) (1.057) (1.480)
FC -2.352 -2.162 -1.294 -2.513**
 (1.353) (1.209) (1.217) (1.010)
DTI -3.020** -3.183** -3.712** -2.595*
 (1.005) (1.092) (1.305) (1.273)
INFV 0.594*** 0.621**
 (0.144) (0.218)
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We find that inflation volatility has a positive association with currency 
mismatches in the model (2) and (3). This finding is consistent with earlier studies, 
including Baek (2013), Lane and Shambaugh (2010b), and Benetrix et al. (2015). In 
terms of the currency risk, measured by the exchange rate volatility, we find a link 
between volatility in the bilateral exchange rate and liability position in foreign 
currencies. Exchange rate volatility accounts for both currency risk and domestic 
instability. Exchange rate volatility has a positive coefficient and statistically 
significant in all models. This supports the view that currency risk can raise 
foreign currency debt and raise the liability position in foreign currencies. As an 
alternative measure of trade openness, we include exports, and the estimates are 
identical to those of the benchmark. The results confirm a negative and significant 
relationship between currency mismatch and exports.
The currency mismatch (CMi,t) method assumes that domestic bank loans 
and bonds are denominated in domestic currencies. Nevertheless, few country’s 
private bank loans and bonds are issued in foreign currencies. Therefore, we 
include “the share of foreign currency in domestic bank loans to the private sector, 
and the share of exchange rate linked instruments in domestic public debt” in 
the modified version of currency mismatch index following Goldstein and Turner 
(2004). As expected, the inclusion of these two instruments increases the share of 
foreign currency in total debt and the size of currency mismatch in our sample.
Table 8. 
Baseline Regression Results (Continued)
Currency Mismatch  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
POP 17.328***
(2.109)
EXP -0.122**
(0.039)
Regime -1.254*
(0.664)
LD -34.003***
 (6.967)
M2 -0.017
 (0.030)
OSIN 7.465***
 (1.643)
DI -0.078*
 (0.042)
Constant -41.559*** -30.235 -42.904*** -159.947*** -54.022**
 (11.542) (20.925) (10.654) (24.331) (22.563)
Observations 220 200 200 210 190
Number of countries 22 20 20 21 19
Hausman test 10.50 474.47*** 19.34** 94.94*** 200.20***
Sargan-Hansen statistic 20.06*** 54.42*** 78.68*** 87.04*** 33.07***
R-squared 0.173 0.272 0.268 0.292 0.349
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To examine the robustness of the estimates to this modification, we re-estimate 
Eq. (4) using an alternative version of currency mismatch (MCMi,t) as the dependent 
variable. We present the same set of model specifications and regressors as in the 
benchmark models in Table 9. The modification of the assumption slightly changes 
the statistical significance of the regressors, although the results are qualitatively 
similar to the benchmark estimates. The coefficient of monetary independence is 
significant in model (1). In contrast, we fail to find the significant effect of capital 
openness and pegged exchange rate on the modified currency mismatch measure, 
but the coefficient on the flexible exchange rate regime index is significant in 
model (3). 
Table 9. 
Modified Currency Mismatch: Robustness Checks
This table presents the estimates of robustness tests. We re-estimate Eq. (4) using an alternative version of currency 
mismatch (MCMi,t). We include “the share of foreign currency in domestic bank loans to the private sector and the 
share of exchange rate linked instruments in domestic public debt” in the modified version of currency mismatch. 
The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses. The statistical significance levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The variables definition and data sources presented in Table 3.
Modified Currency Mismatch (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 8.357*** 8.533*** 52.956*** 9.481***
 (0.833) (1.795) (7.109) (1.314)
INF 0.602*** 0.579** 0.528**
 (0.181) (0.209) (0.215)
ERV 0.215*** 0.206*** 0.144** 0.215*** 0.165**
 (0.053) (0.059) (0.053) (0.054) (0.063)
TO -0.036 -0.110 -0.082 -0.111**
 (0.041) (0.061) (0.050) (0.037)
Quality -0.132*** -0.430*** -0.520*** -0.146 -0.459***
 (0.034) (0.048) (0.050) (0.117) (0.086)
MII -6.965*** -2.834 -1.259 -2.247 2.987
 (1.078) (1.916) (1.412) (1.651) (2.867)
Ka_open 0.147 1.601 4.899 1.331
 (3.971) (2.717) (2.946) (3.585)
Peg 3.196 -0.393 -3.706
 (1.935) (1.485) (2.287)
FC -4.041* -3.799* -2.025 -4.143**
 (2.112) (1.867) (1.916) (1.478)
DTI -3.757* -3.957* -4.541** -5.205*
 (1.837) (1.979) (1.833) (2.449)
INFV 0.808*** 0.933**
 (0.222) (0.340)
POP 31.555***
(5.582)
EXP -0.248**
(0.082)
Regime -3.550**
(1.174)
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To address endogeneity, we re-estimate all benchmark specifications using 
one-year lagged values of all country-specific factors except country size as 
instruments, following prior studies (Baek, 2013; Park and Mercado, 2014; 
Gadanecz et al., 2018). Tables 10 and 11 report the estimates; the tables confirm the 
robustness of our estimates. When explanatory variables are lagged by one-year, 
the sign and significance of coefficients remain broadly unchanged. Nonetheless, 
the coefficients of the lagged peg exchange rate, limits on foreign currency loans, 
inflation volatility, and the level of economic development become statistically 
insignificant in all specifications. 
Table 9. 
Modified Currency Mismatch: Robustness Checks (Continued)
Modified Currency Mismatch (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LD -46.512***
 (8.067)
M2 -0.092*
 (0.048)
OSIN 12.743***
 (2.484)
DI -0.164**
 (0.067)
Constant -107.448*** -83.243** -84.780** -265.609*** -97.332***
(14.131) (29.076) (28.378) (26.307) (25.423)
Observations 220 200 200 210 190
Number of countries 22 20 20 21 19
Sargan-Hansen statistic 26.67*** 37.49*** 36.97*** 71.34*** 29.47***
Hausman test 21.42*** 51.19*** 117.61*** 246.66*** 127.29***
R-squared 0.167 0.255 0.284 0.291 0.404
Table 10. 
Endogeneity Check: Baseline Regression Results
This table shows the findings of baseline regression models with lagged explanatory variables. To avoid endogeneity, 
we re-estimate all benchmark specifications using one-year lagged values of all country-specific factors except 
variable country size as instruments to correct for the possible endogeneity. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in 
parentheses. The statistical significance levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The variables are as defined 
in Table 3. The variables definition and data sources presented in Table 3.
Currency mismatch  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Size 5.749*** 4.261*** 9.983*** 8.179***
 (0.884) (1.238) (2.944) (0.708)
INF_1 0.445** 0.444* 0.363*
 (0.173) (0.216) (0.190)
ERV_1 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.109*** 0.151*** 0.151***
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
TO_1 -0.028 -0.042 -0.043 -0.047*
 (0.020) (0.038) (0.033) (0.023)
Quality_1 -0.177*** -0.297*** -0.328*** -0.239*** -0.278***
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.055) (0.042) (0.075)
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Table 10. 
Endogeneity Check: Baseline Regression Results (Continued)
Currency mismatch  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
MII_1 -4.471*** -1.654** -0.594 -2.806*** 0.144
 (0.567) (0.624) (0.656) (0.812) (0.551)
Ka_open_1 2.736 2.615 3.922** 2.423**
 (2.030) (1.457) (1.615) (1.051)
Peg_1 0.978 0.117 -2.090
 (1.979) (1.692) (1.620)
FC_1 -1.842 -1.698 -1.341 -1.246
 (1.049) (0.995) (1.233) (1.411)
DTI_1 -3.956*** -4.110** -3.641*** -3.548***
 (1.143) (1.266) (0.731) (0.922)
INFV_1 0.184 0.389
 (0.211) (0.246)
POP 17.473***
(2.701)
EXP_1 -0.096*
(0.042)
Regime_1 -1.828*
(0.948)
LD_1 -3.923
 (2.749)
M2_1 0.012
 (0.041)
OSIN_1 9.124***
 (1.276)
DI_1 -0.088***
 (0.022)
Constant -68.083*** -38.618* -47.379*** -85.312*** -95.861***
 (11.365) (20.041) (11.495) (16.043) (12.042)
Observations 220 200 200 210 190
Number of countries 22 20 20 21 19
Sargan-Hansen statistic 27.62*** 54.40*** 59.44*** 139.43*** 86.99***
Hausman test 10.04 23.88*** 50.48*** 46.85*** 44.35***
R-squared 0.239 0.249 0.281 0.312 0.412
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Table 11. 
Endogeneity Check: Modified Currency Mismatch
This table shows the findings of modified currency mismatch regression with lagged explanatory variables. To avoid 
endogeneity, we re-estimate all benchmark specifications using one-year lagged values of all country-specific factors 
except variable country size as instruments to correct for the possible endogeneity. The Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors are in parentheses. The statistical significance levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The variables 
definition and data sources presented in Table 3.
Modified Currency Mismatch  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Size 10.783*** 8.558*** 17.809*** 12.995***
 (1.712) (2.194) (4.546) (1.140)
INF_1 0.685** 0.714** 0.571**
 (0.214) (0.302) (0.250)
ERV_1 0.240*** 0.235*** 0.158*** 0.238*** 0.208***
 (0.058) (0.044) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037)
TO_1 -0.030 -0.083 -0.086 -0.085*
 (0.033) (0.068) (0.059) (0.045)
Quality_1 -0.076 -0.278** -0.348*** -0.213** -0.436***
 (0.066) (0.101) (0.087) (0.075) (0.125)
MII_1 -8.565*** -2.299 -01 -3.919* 1.786
 (1.874) (1.805) (1.313) (2.091) (1.259)
Ka_open_1 4.599 4.243 6.625* 2.436
 (4.527) (3.406) (3.181) (2.999)
Peg_1 3.008 1.819 -2.523
 (2.797) (1.955) (1.659)
FC_1 -2.737 -2.419* -1.840 -1.867
 (1.712) (1.267) (1.922) (2.169)
DTI_1 -6.002** -6.230** -5.475** -6.914**
 (2.370) (2.588) (1.701) (2.277)
INFV_1 0.216 0.635
 (0.331) (0.361)
POP 35.715***
(4.968)
EXP_1 -0.172**
(0.062)
Regime_1 -4.067***
(1.216)
LD_1 -6.314
 (4.830)
M2_1 04
 (0.056)
OSIN_1 15.028***
 (3.150)
DI_1 -0.216***
 (0.045)
Constant -143.678*** -97.065** -116.154*** -170.164*** -148.532***
 (25.144) (34.813) (25.712) (23.691) (18.034)
Observations 220 200 200 210 190
Number of countries 22 20 20 21 19
Sargan-Hansen statistic 36.07*** 31.28*** 32.27*** 214.90*** 74.33***
Hausman test  6.80 10.41 418.52*** 228.60*** 144.82***
R-squared 0.200 0.231 0.290 0.300 0.481
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VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We measure the original sin and currency mismatches in 22 EMEs for the period 
of 2008 to 2017. We find that Latin American economies have greater original sin 
problem than other economies. We identify weaknesses in domestic macroeconomic 
policy and institutions as the primary factors causing currency mismatches. Our 
empirical results confirm that fiscal and monetary policy factors are critical to 
control currency mismatches. In our panel regression analysis, we find that global 
and country-specific characteristics, such as country size, trade openness, and the 
levels of economic and financial development, explain the cross-country variation 
in currency mismatches. 
Our findings suggest that EMEs can make significant progress in reducing their 
net liability positions in foreign currencies by pursuing monetary independence 
and by following stable monetary and fiscal policies. Unlike the original sin 
hypothesis, our results prove that the floating exchange rate policy is a necessary 
condition to limiting currency mismatches in EMEs. Our empirical results suggest 
that EMEs should create a better institutional environment to reduce currency 
mismatches. Such a quality environment will also contribute to macroeconomic 
stability and to the development of the domestic bond market. Moreover, the 
empirical analysis suggests that effective macroprudential policy measures can 
curb currency mismatches. Therefore, EMEs should introduce further limits on 
foreign currency loans and debt to income ratios to reduce systemic risk and 
currency mismatches. 
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Appendix
A1. Model Specification and Expected Outcome. 
We extend the baseline regression (Eq. 4) by incorporating the following variables. 
Pegi,t - the dummy variable which takes the value of one for the countries following 
peg exchange rate regime (Ilzetzki et al., 2018); the macroprudential policy 
indicators - limits on foreign currency loans and limits on debt to income ratio 
are denoted as (FCi,t) and (DTIi,t). LDi,t, and M2i,t are the GDP per capita in log 
levels and broad money supply as a percentage of GDP respectively; We include 
additional variables such as original sin hypothesis (OSINi,t) and debt intolerance 
(DIi,t) in regression. 
Based on the theoretical literature, the expected relationships are as follows. 
Country size is the global factor or important control variable of currency mismatch, 
and its sign of the coefficient is ambiguous. The large size countries in terms 
of either GDP or total population may lower the FCTD, and hence they reduce 
the currency mismatches. However, large size countries also issue more foreign 
currency debt leading to a net liability position in foreign currency (Benetrix et al., 
2015). The sign of the coefficient on inflation is expected to be positive, implying 
higher currency mismatches or perceived currency risk due to the greater level of 
inflation (Reinhart et al., 2003; Goldstein and Turner, 2004; Baek, 2013).
The expected sign of exchange rate volatility is positive. The exchange rate 
volatility can raise the value of foreign currency debt and increases the liability 
position in foreign currency (Baek, 2013). Further, economies with a higher degree 
of trade openness have better access to foreign currency assets and international 
financial markets than the closed economies (Eichengreen et al., 2005b; Baek, 
2013). Therefore, the expected association between currency mismatch and trade 
openness is negative. The institutional quality and monetary independence 
aggravate the currency mismatches because a country with better institutional 
quality lowers the FCD and increases the share of domestic currency in foreign 
debt (Lane and Shambaugh, 2010b). 
In EMEs, financial openness increases the volatility in all levels of investment, 
such as FDI, portfolio investment, and loans. Thus, countries with an open capital 
account hold debt in foreign currency, which increases the currency mismatches 
(Barajas and Morales, 2003; Park and An, 2012). Therefore, we expect a positive 
sign of the coefficient. Further, the effect of the exchange rate regime on currency 
mismatches is ambiguous –the floating exchange rate regime entails the hedging 
facility and lowers the currency risk but increases the currency risk through the 
inflationary economy (Martı́nez and Werner, 2002; Hausmann and Panizza, 2003).
The macroprudential policies are designed to limit the external shocks and 
systemic risks, which are frequently used in EMEs. Thus, we expect a drop in 
the currency mismatches with better policy measures. Countries with a high level 
of development and financial development are expected to have lower currency 
mismatches. Finally, the original sin hypothesis and debt intolerance have a positive 
and negative influence on currency mismatches, respectively (Eichengreen et al., 
2005b; Reinhart et al., 2003).
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